I had quite a few people raise concerns about the election while I was serving
as judge, and I informed all those people that I would forward their concerns
to the board of elections. Shortly after the election I mailed a letter with
these concerns and my own observations of the process and how to streamline the
process some. It's been three weeks now, and I still haven't received even
a phone call. What's a guy to do? Post the letter in his blog. Yes, fellow
citizens of Allegheny County, someone is trying to do stuff about this --
however, we'll have to wait and see if anything happens as a result of this.
Division of Elections
Allegheny County
542 Forbes Ave., Room 609
Pittsburgh, PA 15219-2953
Dear Sir or Madam:
On May 16th, 2006 I had the privilege to serve as an election judge
for the primary election in the 14th ward, 26th district of
Pittsburgh. It was my first time serving on election day, which made
things very interesting. Overall, the experience was very positive.
The rest of the election board was very skilled, hard working, and
most importantly, experienced. Thanks to their hard work, we had
almost no issues for our district. The few voter issues we did have were
resolved in fairly short order. However, it is likely that the only
reason we had the time to resolve these issues was because of the very
low voter turnout, during the November election, which will see much
higher turnout, we may not be able to adequately address all the voter
needs.
In particular, there are some issues that I would be negligent if I
did not address before the November election. One of the largest
issues is the lack of a paper trail related to the ballots. I
volunteered to serve as a judge because I wanted insight into how
these machines worked and how the voters used the machines and what
their reactions were. During the day, I kept a tally of the voters
who asked questions about the machines and their lack of a paper
trail. Of the 143 voters at our district, 12 raised concerns about
the lack of a paper trail from the voting machines. Each of these
people raised their concerns without my prompting. In particular, one
voter wanted to cast a paper ballot to show her opposition to the
current voting machines. When I explained that she would most likely
be the only person to vote on paper that day, and that as a result,
her vote would not be at all anonymous, she expressed grave concern
and said she was ``stuck between a rock and a hard place''. She
agreed to vote using the iVotronic machines only after I assured that
I would forward her issues to the department of elections.
Many of these voters, eight to be precise, were aware of the issues
with lever voting machines and their inaccuracies and lack of a true
paper trail. However, they were concerned that with the lever
machines small inaccuracies were common, but with the iVotronic
machines, a large scale attack could possibly be launched. One voter,
a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, was concerned that although
we posted a zero tape on the wall, it was trivially easy to write a
program that would print out zeroes next to each candidates name at
the start of the morning. He also expressed the opinion that a
similar program could be created to print the final tapes at the end
of the night. If combined with machine tampering, it would be
impossible to know if the will of the people was followed or not.
Four of these voters expressed the opinion that voting with optical
scan ballots might be better. I took a chance to explain to these
people some of the problems with optical scan ballots, in particular,
the exploit from Harry Hursti that allows for placing negative votes
for a candidate. Only one of these voters correctly realized that the
Hursti exploit relies on AccuBasic, a feature only present on Diebold
machines.
I also took a chance to explain to each of the voters who asked about
the lack of a voter verifiable paper audit trail on the electronic
voting machines why under the current set of laws we cannot have a
paper trail in Pennsylvania. Namely that the current offering from
ES&S produces a sequential roll of paper from which we could derive
the votes of each voter. A few asked why they couldn't have a stub to
take home, and I explained the issue with vote selling. One voter
correctly surmised that if ES&S iVotronic machines were able to cut
off each stub of paper and drop it into a box, that this would satisfy
the requirements for the commonwealth. Given the size of the contract
from Allegheny county, it is my belief that the county would be well
served in pressing ES&S for such a device. If this is not possible,
it would be nice to have information for voters regarding the
requirements of voting machines in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and a brief explanation of the security measures of the iVotronic
voting machines. I strongly believe that the addition of a paper
trail will be bring confidence to the electoral process, however, if
that is not possible, a better explanation would help significantly.
The other people on the election board in my district were unaware of
the controversy regarding the electronic voting machines.
While the paper trail was the largest issue raised by voters, there
were a handful of other issues that should be addressed. Firstly,
while the machines are a step forward in terms of accessibility from
the old lever machines, they lack a consistent user interface. In
particular, the shift from having to use the touch screen to the vote
button and back to the touch screen confused many voters. After about
ten voters had been processed at our district, we began to give a brief
tutorial to the voter about how to use the machine when we brought up
their ballot. Many people indicated this was very helpful, however
we're not sure how well it will work in November when we are much
busier and cannot take an additional minute to explain the usage of
the machine. Another common complaint about the user interface was
that it was inconsistent about how to move around. In particular, we
had numerous voters request assistance after getting to the end of
page two of the ballot and not remember they needed to press
``review'' to continue with the process. Perhaps a smaller set of
instructions that can be taped inside the ``wings'' of the voting
machine would be helpful for explaining how to do common tasks on the
machine.
Within our district we had several voters who had poor vision -- each of these
individuals was offered the ability to use an audio ballot instead of the
visual ballot, however none took advantage of this. I'm not 100% sure why
this is, but one voter in particular indicated he would feel ``strange'' doing
that. This voter instead took a long time and looked very closely at the
ballot to read the names on the ballot. Another voter signed a declaration of
assistance and had his wife help him. Neither of these two voters were blind,
however the font size on the display was far too small for them to easily read.
The demonstration provided on the ES&S website for the iVotronic shows a
machine with a ``zoom'' option. When pressed, this zooms in the ballot with
large print on a particular race. For these voters, such an innovation would
be a wonder. I highly recommend looking into this for the November race as it
will bring new freedom for these voters. For those who cannot read at all
(because of blindness, illiteracy, etc), more information may be helpful to
describe what the audio ballot is. As poll workers, none of us had ever used
the audio ballot, and when I asked about it at the training session I was told
that it takes a long time. The ability to present the same ballot in multiple
ways is one of the strongest features of these machines, I believe that
Allegheny county should be taking advantage of it.
There were four voters that asked about the openness of the new
machines layout, indicating that they were slightly leery of the fact
that anyone could see who was voting even if they could not see their
votes. While some of this was just yearning for the curtain enclosed
lever booths, others seemed generally concerned they may be influenced
or feel rushed -- especially if a long line was developing. The best
explanation I could come up with was that the open nature prevented
someone from using a camera phone and taking a video of the casting of
their ballot -- thus preventing a new avenue for vote selling. Is
there an official explanation of why the booths are so open, or is
it just a design issue?
There were several other minor issues mainly related to running of the election
and not so much related to voter issues that should have been addressed too.
Firstly, it was a poor decision to have the PEBs sealed in the ballot box at
the end of the night as this required the election board to open up the ballot
box which may have had optical scan ballots in it. Fortunately, our district
had no optical scan ballots -- there was a single absentee, which was a
military write in ballot that was filled out completely. Were thre a
handful of people who voted by optical scan ballot, they ballots would
be in nearly sequential order and their votes could be found out.
The process for the handling of absentee ballots was confusing.
Firstly, there was little guidance about what to do if a voter who was
on the absentee list arrived to vote. We were told that they could
vote and we should dispose of their absentee ballot, however this is
in direct contradiction to the text of the voting card which a voter
signs. On these cards, the voter is making a declaration that they
haven't voted by absentee or any other means. Clearly, these issues
need to be reconciled.
Another large difficulty we had was closing down the polls at the end
of the night. There was no cohesive set of instructions for all the
envelopes or source of all the documents. In fact, both districts at
our polling place lacked the affidavit form we needed to sign if one
initialed in the voter book. If this material were better organized,
perhaps into a binder format with a checklist for the end of the
night, it is my belief that things would go better and faster. As a
judge, one thing I struggled with, and I noticed many others also were
struggling with was what material to bring into Reisenstein school at
the end of the night, what to put in the ballot box, and what to leave
in the suitcase. A single checklist of tasks could make this much
easier and save time for all those involved in the election process.
Finally, one point where there was much confusion was regarding
cancelled ballots. In the training session we were told that a
cancelled ballot would show up on the public count for the voting
machine, when in fact they did not (this was confirmed by speaking
with the judge in a neighboring district during the day who did not
see any result from cancelling votes). Was this the same issue that
prevented the sample machines used in training from counting cancelled
ballots? Or are cancelled ballots only counted in the protected
count, or not at all? If cancelled ballots are not counted is there
harm in the judge opening up a ballot and showing a voter how to use
it and then cancelling that ballot before bringing the voter her
ballot? Being able to show exactly what happens on the ballot would
make explanation of the ballot much easier than having to leave the
area around the voter as soon as they opening instructions
disappeared.
Overall I had a very positive experience serving Allegheny County on election
day. It was a wonderful introduction into the nitty-gritty elements of
democracy. The election went much smoother than most imagined. However, if
voter turnout is high in November, which given the current Governor and Senate
races in the commonwealth it probably will be, then addressing some of these
issues now could significantly help out in the future. The favor of a
reply to these issues would be appreciated as I believe it will make
the election process run smoother and allow me to better serve the
county. You can reach me at the above address, or by telephone at 412-XXX-XXXX.
Thank you,
Patrick Wagstrom