Vertical Interaction in Open Software Engineering Communities

Patrick Wagstrom Ph.D. Thesis Defense March 9, 2009

Committee: James Herbsleb Kathleen Carley M. Granger Morgan Audris Mockus



http://www.flickr.com/photos/nixternal/3131672372/

8

Cir.

0

vountu

 \bigcirc

Open Source is BIG Business

Year	Target	Buyer	Amount
2008	MySQL	Sun	\$1 billion
2008	Trolltech	Nokia	\$153 million
2007	Zimbra	Yahoo!	\$350 million
2007	XenSource	Citrix	\$500 million
2006	JBoss	RedHat	\$350 million
2003	SuSE	Novell	\$210 million
1999	Cygnus	RedHat	\$675 million



http://www.eclipse.org/org/foundation/membersminutes/20080317MembersMeeting/DirectorsReport.pdf

Central Players In Open Source



4 Empirical Studies

- Firms and Foundations
- Firms and Firms
- Firms and Individuals
- Individuals and Individuals

Firms and Foundations: **Guiding an Ecosystem** to Promote Value

The Problem

- Some research has been done about why individual focused OSS projects utilize foundations
- Little research has addressed why commercial firms would participate in foundations
 - Large monetary cost
 - Giving up some control
 - Possibly increased work
- What does the foundation do to drive value?

Data

 Semi-structured interviews with Eclipse Foundation staff and employees of member companies

- 38 interviews with 40 individuals

- Face-to-face meetings at EclipseCon 2007 and 2008
- Participation in Eclipse members meetings

Driving Value Creation

- Non-market player
- Introduction of process
- Value of the Eclipse brand and marketing
- Organizational structure driving value
- Platform for innovation

Non-Market Player

- Eclipse grew out of IBM's old VisualAge ecosystem
- Small firms had to worry about being stepped on
- Allows innovation without worry about "Gorillas"
- Opens the door for distribution based business models

Platform for Innovation

- Foundation actively recruits new members
- Encourages components to be as modular as possible
 - Modularity == Independence from other components
- Create projects outside of Eclipse and bring inside later
- Push usage outside traditional realms

Takeaways

- Eclipse Foundation has taken concrete steps to build ecosystem
- Governance structure ensures all can provide input
- Non-market nature is very beneficial
- Services provided for members are worth the cost

Firms and Firms: **Business Collaboration** Through Open Source

The Problem

- Much data about how individuals interact in OSS
- Little data about how firms collaborate
- Is there an overdependence on single firms?
- How collaborative are OSS ecosystems?

Data

- Projects from Eclipse Foundation
- Two level project hierarchy
 - Top Level Projects (11)
 - Sub Projects (89)
- Collected data from version control system and IP repository
- Ties individuals to code changes and firms
- Compared with data from GNOME

How Much Collaboration Really Exists?

Number of firms per project



Collaboration in CDT

IBM Leaves/QNX Lead



Who Builds the Platform?



Fractional Commits for eclipse.platform

Fraction of Commits



Takeaways

- Participation in an OSS ecosystem may require little collaboration with other firms
- Many key portions of Eclipse are centered on IBM
- Allows IBM to exert great influence, even though no longer at the center
- The organic community around GNOME shows much more collaboration

Firms and Individuals: The Impact of Commercial **Participation on Volunteer** Participation

The Problem

- Commercial firms have different interests than volunteer OSS developers
- Firms bring many resources to projects that benefit projects
- What impact do these firms have on volunteer participation?

Data

- Source code version control, bug tracker, and email lists from GNOME project
- Individuals are disambiguated and identities linked
- Commercial affiliation for developers identified
- Face to face interviews with 18 developers

Firm Classifications

- 9 major firms in community
- Divided into two categories -
 - Product focused
 - Community focused
- Validated through interviews
- Developers from community focused firms generally more active within the community

Do commercial developers drive away volunteers?

 Designed a multilevel model to predict current volunteers based on previous participation

 $VolDevs_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 VolDevs_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 ComDevs_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Commits_{i,t-1} + \nu_i + \epsilon_{i,t}$

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	P-Value
Intercept	0.5643	0.1397	0.0001
VolDevs	0.4562	0.0442	<0.001
ComDevs	0.0817	0.0389	0.0360
Commits	0.0601	0.0242	0.0130

No! They actually have a slight positive impact on the number of volunteers!

Do commercial developers drive away volunteers (by firm)?

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	P-Value
Intercept	0.6032	0.1381	< 0.001
VolDevs	0.4212	0.0443	<0.001
ComDevs(CF)	0.2050	0.0432	<0.001
ComDevs(PF)	-0.0433	0.0388	0.264
Commits	0.0711	0.0234	0.003

Developers at community focused firms have a significant attractive power while developers at product focused firms have no relation.

Takeaways

- Commercial firms do increase volunteer participation in Open Source
- Community focused firms have a much greater attractive power than product focused firms

Individuals and Individuals: **Evolution of the Socio-Technical Congruence** Metric

The Problem

- STC hasn't been replicated in OSS
- Difficult to distill to individual level
 - Typically done at network level
 - Ratio muddles effects of coordination requirements and actual coordination
- Original analysis looked only at short term
 - Most software projects are long term

Data

- GNOME project
- Filtered for projects that had CVS, bug tracker, and mailing list archives
- Do not have as much developer information as Cataldo et. al.
- Examine time to resolve bugs
 - Only include those bugs marked as defects

Individualized STC



Individualized STC



Unweighted Individual Congruence Score

Testing Individualized STC

- Predict log2 of time to resolve defect
- Independent variables
 - Number of developers active on defect
 - Number of people changing defect status
 - Number of comments made
 - Individualized STC for developers

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	P-Value					
Intercept	1.9707	0.0581	< 0.0001					
NumDevs	0.2846	0.0301	<0.0001					
DeltaPeople	0.8074	0.0176	<0.0001					
Comments	-0.0142	0.0036	<0.0001					
UIC	-1.2140	0.0770	<0.0001					
R^	$R^2=0.134$, DF=26507, p < 0.0001							

Disambiguating Results													
0	1	1	0		0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	
1	0	0	1		0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	
1	0	0	1	/ \	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	
0	1	1	0		1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	
		7					T						

Extra Communication Coordination Requirements Matched Communication

Variable	Estimate	Std Error	P-Value				
Intercept	1.4590	0.0568	< 0.0001				
NumDevs	0.2500	0.0306	< 0.0001				
DeltaPeople	0.8020	0.0177	< 0.0001				
Comments	-0.0125	0.0036	0.0006				
MatchedComm	-0.0524	0.0056	<0.0001				
CoordReq	0.0314	0.0032	<0.0001				
extraComm	-0.0119	0.0035	0.0006				
R^2=0.132, DF=26505, p < 0.0001							

Takeaways

- Demonstrated a method to individualize STC
- Should break apart STC metric into it's constituent portions
- Extra communication, not related to coordination requirements, improves task performance

Conclusions

Building OSS Communities

- Not a matter of just throwing code out there
- Designating non-market player for head is helpful
- Need to find way to drive additional value to members, beyond just software
- Enable members to work independently
- Watch the centralization of components
- Invite firms to participate with volunteers
- Encourage discussion in the community

Thank You!

This work was supported in part by a National Science Foundation graduate research fellowship, the National Science Foundation (IIS-0414698), the IGERT Training Program in CASOS(NSF,DGE-9972762), the Office of Naval Research under Dynamic Network Analysis program (N00014-02-1-0973), the Air Force Office of Sponsored Research (MURI: Cultural Modeling of the Adversary, 600322), the Army Research Lab (CTA: 20002504), and the Army Research Institute (W91WAW07C0063) for research in the area of dynamic network analysis. Additional support was provided by CASOS - the center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems at Carnegie Mellon University. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the the National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research Institute.

And more folks than I can fit on a single slide.

